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One of the greatest achievements in the global
negotiations of 2015 that delivered the 2030
Agenda for Sustainable Development or Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs) and the Paris Agreement
on climate change is that, for the first time, the
linkages between climate and development were
enshrined in each of the documents. This was
done in recognition that climate change and
development need to be addressed together in
order not only to avoid harmful trade-offs and high
costs, particularly for poorer countries, but also to
exploit the benefits that come from strengthening
these linkages. This review presents some of the
latest data that argue for stronger linkages as well
as the challenges of implementation which are not
only politically and economically related but also
include issues such as knowledge gaps, finance
and governance. Finally, the review also presents
a glimpse at the pathways that will be required to
reach the ambitious global temperature targets of
the Paris Agreement of less than 2°C above pre-
industrial levels with efforts to limit temperature rise
even further to 1.5°C. This provides the context for
some conclusions and recommendations for policy-
makers, including on methodologies for assessing
linkages and leveraging them for greater benefit.
2018 The Authors. Published by the Royal Society under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/4.0/, which permits unrestricted use, provided the original author and
source are credited.
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This article is part of the theme issue ‘The Paris Agreement: understanding the physical and
social challenges for a warming world of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels’.
1. Introduction
Two major achievements in global negotiations are likely to have a significant transformative
effect on the global development agenda for decades to come. The Sustainable Development
Goals (SDGs) [1] and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
Paris Agreement [2] aspire to transform the way in which development issues and climate change
are addressed. For the first time ever, there is an agreement by the international community on
priority areas for development with an actionable agenda and a global commitment to reach
certain targets and goals between now and 2030. The 17 SDGs constitute an agenda that seeks to
balance the three dimensions of sustainable development—social, economic and environmental—
as well as issues of governance and institutions [3]. This is in recognition of the fact that it is
difficult, if not impossible, to achieve socio-economic gains if the environment, and threats such
as climate change, are neglected; and that promoting synergies and mitigating or eliminating
trade-offs among SDGs is essential for achieving this balance and for helping achieve the
temperature targets of the Paris Agreement. In this regard, understanding how the various SDGs
are interlinked is crucial to the formulation of good policies and more effective action and finance
in support of implementation.
One of the messages of this review is that the success of each of these two global agreements
will depend heavily on the other and on the capacity of countries to develop and implement
programmes of action to address their climate and development objectives in an integrated,
coordinated and comprehensive way. Institutions, policies, governance and finance will need
to play key roles in support of these efforts. Through their 17 global goals and 169 targets, the
SDGs provide the most comprehensive and balanced global development agenda to date to
help countries meet the immense current development challenges without compromising their
chances to adequately address climate change [4]. The objective is to be able to meet the growing
needs of development while making sure that low-carbon transition goals are incorporated into
the development agenda [5]. Asia and Africa particularly face some of the biggest challenges.
Africa, where greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions per capita are the lowest because of historical
poverty trends and stagnation, is now growing and some of its cities count among the fastest
growing in the world [6]. This will bring higher GHG emissions unless policies and strategies are
put into place to mitigate them. It is an excellent opportunity for the continent to embark on a
low-carbon development path using its immense resource endowments suitable for renewable
energy. Asia, the continent that currently emits 40% of the global GHG emissions, which are
due to continue rising by some 50% if policies are not put into place, has the highest growth in
urban population; this is expected to be around 67% by 2030. Major investments will be needed
to meet the demand of this growing population. The Asian Development Bank projects that the
incremental cost of introducing low-carbon development compatible with the Paris Agreement
will be of the order of some US$300 billion per year through 2050 [7].
One of the SDGs, SDG 13, specifically addresses climate and it calls on the international
community to ‘take action to combat climate change and its impacts’. Its targets address issues
of implementation such as planning, policies, institutional and individual capacity building, and,
most importantly, issues of finance. The areas that it addresses for action—mitigation, adaptation
and resilience—are linked to several SDGs that either impact on climate change (such as energy,
industry and infrastructure, production and consumption, and sustainable cities) or are impacted
by climate change (such as poverty, food security, and health among others). As for the Paris
Agreement, for the first time ever, it includes a global commitment for domestic action through
the nationally determined contributions (NDCs), coupled with a promise and commitment to
mobilize climate finance to support those countries which need it. The NDCs represent a major
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turning point in the fight against climate change. The process of preparing them in the lead
up to the UNFCCC Paris Conference of the Parties (COP21) has already triggered a major
mobilization of national consultations, debate and interest, and expectations have been raised. In
some countries, special institutional arrangements for implementation of the NDCs have begun to
emerge. The questions that need to be explored are whether these emerging arrangements and/or
old existing ones will be up to the task of ensuring an effective implementation and whether the
commitments are sufficiently ambitious.
According to the most recent United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) Emissions
Gap Report [7], current commitments by countries through their NDCs fall short of what is
required to meet the ambitious goals of the Paris Agreement. The data in this UNEP report show
that the world is on its way to a temperature rise of 2.9–3.4°C even when accounting for the
current NDC pledges. A study conducted by the Asian Development Bank [8] estimates that
the commitments made in the NDC pledges by Asia, which is the fastest growing region, are
far from being sufficient for the Paris Agreement requirements. Current NDCs commit to halve
the GHG emissions by 2050. The Asian Development Bank estimates that, to meet the targets,
the reductions would need to be around three-quarters. The process established to periodically
review and strengthen these pledges will need therefore to address these deficits. This is a pre-
requisite for the success of the Paris Agreement. The first review will take place in 2018 and every
5 years thereafter. Each of these will be an opportunity to ramp up the ambition as well as the
political will and support needed based on assessments made.
For these UNFCCC periodic reviews to be successful, research will also need to be ramped
up so that policy-makers have clarity not only on the implications of temperature rise, costs
of inaction and the windows of opportunity but also on the options for action. Thus, the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) special assessment report on the science of
1.5°C to be published in 2018 will be very timely. Given the ambition of the goals, all stakeholders
will need to contribute. The research and science will need to provide answers that are relevant
to different constituencies. One crucial constituency includes sub-national and city leaders. Data
and research need to be offered so that they can assess the implications of climate change and the
types of action that can be taken in the short, medium and long term.
2. Climate and development linkages
Over the past two decades, a large body of literature has offered important insights into the socio-
economic costs and benefits of addressing climate change. The results provide strong justification
for the urgent need to carefully examine the linkages between climate and development to exploit
the synergies and avoid or mitigate the negative trade-offs. The intention here is not to create a
comprehensive list of the literature but rather to present a selection to reinforce the argument
that the success of the Paris Agreement is dependent on understanding and acting on these
linkages.
The following is a sample of the literature and some of the messages and conclusions
presented. These include the global assessments of the science and the literature on the global
and sectoral impacts of climate change; reports that assess the costs of climate change to the
global economy, a key piece in the puzzle of how climate change will actually shape the global
economy so that policy-makers can gauge the level of investments in emissions reduction to
counteract the negative effects; the cost of inaction, which has helped to emphasize the urgency
and the magnitude of the investments required to avoid higher costs, and the windows of
opportunity for taking these measures in the most cost-effective manner; the co-benefits that
come from taking these measures, particularly for ecosystems and human health, which have
been important incentives for policy-makers to invest in climate change measures particularly
at the national level; assessments of impacts at the regional level, mostly on agriculture and
the hydrological cycle; national studies with more tailored research into the impacts of climate
change on ecosystems, economies and societies such as those of Austria, Australia and Uganda
mentioned below; studies on the effects on the value of investments and financial assets to help
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investors carry out relevant risk assessment and studies on how climate change has already
impacted and could impact the levels of migration in the future, as well as peace and conflict.
The recent 5th Assessment Report of the IPCC provides one of the most comprehensive global
and sectoral assessments of the impacts of climate change on development, the levels of impact
and the degrees of confidence [9]. In its assessment, the IPCC provides a broad view of impacts
on key sectors for development and well-being, including, among others, food security, urban
systems and the effects on key economic sectors such as energy, water, transport, human health,
human security and poverty. The most important conclusion is that climate-related hazards
aggravate factors that bring negative consequences, particularly to people living in poverty. The
result, the IPCC concludes, is that climate change makes existing poverty worse, leading to
more inequality and more vulnerability. It also concludes that climate change ‘will create new
poor between now and 2100, in developing and developed countries, and jeopardize sustainable
development’ [9].
On the global economy, a study recently published in Nature shows that the impact on the
global economy due to rising temperatures is greater than previously assessed. According to
this study, the effects include a significant fall in incomes in most countries by the year 2100
under a business-as-usual scenario [10]. Another recent study published by the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) [11] assesses the consequences of climate
change for a selected number of drivers of growth, including productivity, capital supply and
labour. The quantitative assessments made to the year 2060 conclude that the greatest negative
effects projected are for the agricultural and health sectors, and the greatest damage to take
place will be in developing countries, particularly Africa and Asia. Less recent but interesting
studies look at the potential negative consequences of climate policy for the economy and how to
offset them with a focus on employment effects [12,13]. In these studies, the authors examine the
political economy aspects of emissions reduction policies and the short-term considerations that
often dominate these discussions. A more balanced approach, they argue, would take the longer
view and include policies designed to mitigate or avoid the negative effects that could result from
restrictive emissions reduction policies.
One stream of research has been focusing on the costs resulting from a lack of action or
delayed action and the severe effects on poorer countries. In this category, one of the best
known reviews that helped to shape and influence thinking and research over the decade leading
to the Paris Agreement is the Stern Review [14], which concluded, among other things, that
all countries would be affected but that developing countries would be the hardest hit and
sooner than most. The Stern Review predicted that this would happen when different events
interacted to compound the effects on welfare: disruptions to the water cycle, health aspects,
reductions in agricultural production and an increase in the number of weather events, making
adaptation more difficult and costly [15]. The Review pointed out the potential major and lasting
damage to human life, health and the environment, but also the effects on productive capital
and consequently on economic growth. On a more positive note, the Review pointed out that
disastrous climate change impacts are still avoidable if we act now rather than later, when the
costs will be higher, and with increased international cooperation. The Review also focused on
the costs of inaction and, most importantly, argued that these costs would be greater than the
costs of action. Unabated climate change, the Review showed, would lead to a cost to the world
economy of some 5% of gross domestic product (GDP). However, the cost of reducing emissions
could be limited to some 1% of GDP. In a recent lecture to celebrate 10 years since the publication
of the Review [16], the lead author updated some of the main messages and conclusions. The
following are some of the highlights of these updates: science has advanced and shown that the
risks are even greater than previously thought; GHG emissions per year have grown instead of
decreased; there is greater recognition of the economics of climate change and low-carbon growth
opportunities; the concept of ‘cost of action’ has been transformed by the major technological
breakthroughs, particularly in renewable energy and energy efficiency, bringing a welcome shift
from the notion of ‘costs’ to one of ‘investment’ that has created a world of new opportunities;
political progress is slowly picking up particularly since the Paris Agreement; bottom-up action
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has increased with more active sub-national actors and private sector engagement; and, finally,
there is welcome news that there is growing recognition that sustainable development, poverty
reduction and climate are inextricably linked.
One study by the Economist Intelligence Unit [17] focused on the impact of climate change
on current managed assets and found that the average value at risk of these assets from climate
change is some 3% of the current value. A study carried out later by the Grantham Research
Institute on Climate Change and the Environment updated some of these estimates using an
integrated assessment model to assess the possible impacts on the current market value of global
financial assets up to 2100 and came up with somewhat equivalent, albeit slightly lower, results
[18]. Two studies, one by International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) researchers,
modelled up to 2050, and one other published in Nature Climate Change, studied the effects of
reducing emissions on co-emitted air pollutants, which in turn brings benefits to health [19,20].
The IIASA study shows how stringent climate mitigation strategies have co-benefits for air quality
and the resulting positive effects linked to human health and reduction of loss of life expectancy
in Europe, India and China by 35%, 46% and 63% respectively; and for ecosystems in Europe
with the lowering of the impact of acidification exposure on forests and less eutrophication due
to less ammonia emissions from agriculture. The study published in Nature Climate Change shows
the significant benefits of improved air quality and the resulting positive impacts on health and
air pollution mortality resulting from GHG emissions reductions. One of the main messages is
that, since these effects and impacts are mostly local and near-term, they may be useful to policy-
makers trying to promote GHG emissions reductions and stringent climate strategies.
Regional and national studies have offered important assessments of the impacts of climate
change not only on ecosystems but also on the economy and society. Some of these include the
study produced by the Austrian Panel on Climate Change [21], which consists of a group of some
200 scientists, over a 3 year period followed the methodology of the IPCC and has enabled policy-
makers to strengthen Austria’s strategy on climate change; the Garnaut Review [22], Australia’s
comprehensive review of the impacts of climate change for Australia and an assessment of the
contributions that Australia could make globally; the economic assessments made on the impact
of climate change on Uganda [23], which estimated that damage to agriculture, infrastructure,
energy and water could total some 2–4% of GDP during the period 2010–2050 and that adaptation
costs were high but the costs of inaction significantly higher by some 20–40 times; studies
that have provided important methodological advances and analysis based on scenarios for the
twenty-first century on the impacts of climate change on the hydrological cycle, such as the one
that estimated the effects on water management in India [24] and the impact of climate change
on water resource quantity and quality indicators for a region in Greece [25]; studies that have
estimated the impacts on climate from the bio-geophysical (BGP) and bio-geochemical (BGC)
effects of land use change in different regions of the world where close to one-third of the global
land surface has already suffered from deforestation and introduction of cropland and pastures
[26]; and studies on ocean acidification and its effect on carbon uptake in different regions of
the world due to decreased carbon dioxide solubility and local warming due to large freshwater
fluxes, among others [27].
The impacts of climate change on the agricultural sector affecting food security have been more
problematic. The general conclusion is that climate change has reduced crop yields by some 1–2%
in each decade over the last century. The projected impacts are expected to worsen in the future
[9]. It has been difficult to have a good understanding of the nature and magnitude of the impacts
because of the number of socio-economic and biophysical factors involved. Recent literature has
made advances using shared socio-economic pathways (SSPs), and recent studies have concluded
that the biophysical agricultural productivity will be negatively impacted by climate change in
most parts of the world. This therefore justifies mitigation efforts. The studies also concluded that
regions will be affected differently, with some crop yields being affected negatively and others
positively depending on the location [28,29].
A scarcer but rapidly growing body of literature is that which includes studies on migration
and peace and conflict. On migration, studies range from those such as a recent article in Nature,
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which makes some inferences on early human migration based on computer modelling of climate
effects [30], to more localized studies such as that carried for Mexico during the decade 1995
to 2005 during which climatic conditions led to severe crop failures and greater than normal
emigration across the border to the USA [31]. The conclusions of this study could be quite
applicable to today and to other regions of the world. Although the total number of people
displaced because of environmental change is not well known, there are some estimates. A study
by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) [32] estimates that, in 2008, there were
more people displaced by extreme weather events (some 20 million) than by conflict and violence
(about 4.6 million). On peace and conflict, one of the most informative studies is that which
appeared recently in Science [33] and which examined a vast array of literature on many types
of human conflict. Focusing on quantitative studies that could reliably show causal associations
between climate variability and conflict, the authors show that there is significant agreement
among the studies on the influence of climate on human conflict across temporal and spatial
scales and across several regions of the world.
There is also a more recent growing body of literature examining interlinkages and
methodologies for measuring these interlinkages between SDGs, including SDG 13 and those
of most other SDGs [3,4,34–36]. In its Review of Targets for the Sustainable Goals: The Science
Perspective, the International Council for Science (ICSU) points out that the lack of proper
response to climate change would most likely make it more difficult to achieve targets related to
many SDGs such zero hunger, good health and well-being, clean water and sanitation, economic
growth, industry, innovation and infrastructure, sustainable cities, and life on land and below
water. Poverty, inequality and peace and justice would also be indirectly affected [3]. In a more
recent publication, the ICSU presents the work by a group of scientists who analysed interactions
and synergies of four SDGs—SDG 2 on Zero Hunger, SDG 3 on Quality Education, SDG 7 on
Affordable and Clean Energy, and SDG 14 on Life Below Water. Although this was not focused on
climate and development interactions, the study did show synergies with SDG 13 on Climate
Action and others. The study offered a methodology for assessing the interactions based on
a seven-point scale to measure positive interactions as well as interactions that could bring
trade-offs [37].
The World in 2050 [38], a new major research initiative in support of the implementation of
the SDGs and the Paris Agreement, presents the following in its vision statement: ‘There is an
urgent need for a truly integrated, comprehensive quantitative understanding of sustainable
development pathways, accounting for the interlinkages between the economy, technology,
environment, climate, human development and planetary boundaries.’ And, in its concept-note,
it goes on to add, ‘The currently used long-term projections for the world economy do not tend
to account for the impact of climate change or different demographic developments. Similarly,
models for climate change mitigation are poorly integrated with models for biodiversity as
well as the use of land and water resources. Moreover, we lack a proper understanding of the
interrelations between policies aimed at productivity growth, material welfare, energy access,
and environmental sustainability’ [38]. There are, therefore, ongoing efforts by this initiative to
integrate some of the world-class models in key sectors such as those for global food policy
(IMPACT/GLOBIOM/GAEZ), ecosystem changes (IMAGE), climate and energy (MESSAGE)
and more recent modelling advances in Earth System Science and economic modelling.
3. Pathways to implementation—some of themain drivers, what action needs
to be taken and on what time scales
The long-term temperature target of the Paris Agreement is ambitious but, according to the best
available science, feasible. It is, however, extremely challenging given that it requires emissions
to peak as early as possible and to reach zero some time around the middle of the century [39]. To
succeed with a 1.5° pathway, a major transformation of systems, particularly energy systems, is
required across sectors and geographies as well as major collaboration globally. A publication
 on April 3, 2018http://rsta.royalsocietypublishing.org/Downloaded from 
7rsta.royalsocietypublishing.org
Phil.Trans.R.Soc.A376:20160444
........................................................
by Nature Climate Change [40] presents some of the main key elements of the energy system
transformation and when they need to take place. Decarbonization of the electricity system is
listed as a top priority. In this context, electricity would need to emit close to zero carbon emissions
by 2050 at the latest. The industry, buildings and transport sectors are singled out as those that
need greater efforts to decarbonize, with one of these sectors, transport, being particularly difficult
due to its dependence on liquid fossil fuels. Another important element in the transformation
of the energy system is the urgent need to reduce energy demand through greater efficiency.
This therefore includes the need for dedicated energy efficiency policies to accelerate energy
intensity reductions. For those sectors that are harder to decarbonize, such as transport and
industry, carbon dioxide removal (CDR) technologies are seen as essential for 1.5°C scenarios
to compensate for residual emissions from these sectors.
Scenarios have been important tools of research on climate and global environmental change.
There is ongoing effort to develop a new family of scenarios that seek to integrate changes in
climate as well as changes in society in order to determine not only the impacts of climate
but also the various available options for mitigation and adaptation [41,42]. Given the close
linkages between climate and development, the design of these new tools of research is essential
and urgent. One of the features of this new family of scenarios is the so-called shared socio-
economic pathways (SSPs). By describing a set of alternative futures, and back casting from a set
of desired narratives, these SSPs provide descriptions of plausible future conditions with different
combinations of challenges to mitigation and adaptation. As work on these SSPs continues and
the tools and framework of analysis become more refined, pathways to implementation that
incorporate not only quantitative components but also qualitative narratives for those issues that
are difficult to quantify will hopefully become more common.
The refinement of these tools is essential to help researchers come up with priorities for
action, particularly those involving the big drivers and megatrends that will determine future
sustainability with major socio-economic consequences. These include, among others, the growth
of energy demand, the food security imperative, the water resilience challenge, and the growth
of urbanization. Of these, the central and most important for the Paris Agreement is the need for
transformation of the energy systems, as already mentioned. The encouraging news in this regard
is the continued improvement in the energy intensity of the global economy and the growth in the
deployment of renewable energy worldwide as well as the projected continued growth [43,44].
In its most recent World Energy Outlook, the International Energy Agency (IEA) sums up the
trends in deployment and costs of clean energy technologies as follows: ‘in 2016, growth in solar
PV [photovoltaic] capacity was larger than for any other form of generation; since 2010, costs of
new solar PV have come down by 70%, wind by 25% and battery costs by 40%’ [44].
Is this encouraging news and developments sufficient? According to projections by the IEA,
some US$44 trillion in energy supply infrastructure will be required based on its main scenario
(to 2040). Of these, the IEA projects that some 20% will be renewable energy. Although this
represents a major shift in capital investments, the study also shows that this is not enough
for the less than 2°C target of the Paris Agreement. In its more stringent scenario required
by a more decarbonized energy system, the IEA projects additional investment in renewable
energy and added investments in energy efficiency. The report also points out another important
trend in the nexus between water and energy, A rising population will increase the demand for
water in urban populations, which in turn will cause a rise in energy demand. The energy use
demand in the water sector is expected to double during the period up to 2040 [45]. In these
and other energy demand analyses, the impact of infrastructure in cities is most prominent.
Consequently, the conclusion is that the Paris Agreement’s target cannot be reached without a
major transformation of energy systems in cities, particularly in its buildings and water, energy
and transport infrastructure.
Cities are projected to add some 2.5 billion residents by 2050 [46], and currently they are
responsible for more than 70% of carbon dioxide emissions [46]. Cities, therefore, need to be a
central part of the effort to reach the Paris Agreement targets as they offer the best opportunities
for decarbonization. And cities in developing countries would need to be a major focus as 90%
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of the urban growth to 2050 is expected to take place mostly in Asia and Africa, where there is
less capacity to address climate change. The challenge will be in coping with the growing needs
while at the same time making sure that the investments to be made are compatible with the less
than 2°C target. Consequently, this is where the bulk of the new infrastructure will need to be
built to address the needs of the growing population, which in turn will require massive new
investments in buildings and in energy, water and transport infrastructure. The first big push, or
perhaps opportunity, will be in the massive investments that are projected to take place globally
between 2015 and 2030. This growth is projected to be some US$90 trillion, which is higher than
the current value of the existing infrastructure, which is estimated to be some US$50 trillion [47].
This infrastructure will have a long life, expanding some 50–100 years with major consequences
for the carbon footprint for decades. The types of investments to be made on buildings,
transport and mobility in general will also have an impact on the urban form of cities, which
in turn will have a lasting influence of decades on the patterns of energy use and lifestyles of
cities [48,49].
Drastically reducing the level of GHG emissions through investments in low-carbon
infrastructure—the physical networks that are responsible for providing water, energy, transport,
buildings, industry and waste management in cities—is, therefore, a prerequisite for the Paris
Agreement targets. With a growing urban population, as already mentioned, large investments
in infrastructure will be required to satisfy their demands, particularly in developing countries
where the greatest growth will take place. It is here where two-thirds of the new investments
will be needed and another third will need to be dedicated to replacing ageing infrastructure
in developed countries [45]. What types of investments are made in urban infrastructure will
also have, as already mentioned, an impact on the urban form or physical structure of cities and
affect the systemic characteristics of urban energy use. This is turn has consequences and a lasting
influence on the patterns of energy use in cities for decades to come and potential carbon lock-in
[48]. A higher density urban form that promotes electric and non-motorized mobility and energy-
efficient buildings will lead to lower energy use, in contrast to urban sprawl, which does not
[50,51]. Path dependencies, particularly in transport, create challenges for policy-makers trying to
introduce low-carbon goals. Vested interests often driven by political goals and economic growth
priorities get in the way of policy-makers trying to break carbon lock-in through less motorized
mobility [52].
In the sections above, the figure given for the investments required only for infrastructure to
attend to the needs of the growing urban population is daunting. Much of the infrastructure
to be built will have life spans of 50–100 years, thus dictating the carbon footprint for decades
to come. Efforts to come up with criteria, metrics and principles for ensuring that these
investments are compatible with the Paris Agreement are increasing, but more research and work
on this is needed. The task is urgent given that, currently, the investment flows, particularly
for infrastructure, are not nearly aligned with the targets of the Paris Agreement [43]. There
are several approaches now being examined. One examines the possibility of coming up with
2°C investment criteria [53] and another uses sectoral and cross-sectoral emissions intensity
thresholds to determine the compatibility of investment decisions with climate targets [54].
Another approach is that which is being taken by development finance institutions (DFIs). Their
objective has been to integrate climate-related criteria in their analyses of project portfolios and
their policies in general. These efforts have been around for some time and long before the Paris
Agreement. The methodology and the discipline introduced for this analysis is nevertheless a
good basis on which to make decisions more rigid and strict [55].
Several studies have examined the various technologies now available for decarbonizing the
building sector. Recent studies also provide the windows of opportunity during which this
decarbonization needs to take place. According to a recent study [56], in order for the 1.5° target to
stay within reach, a fully decarbonized building stock by 2050 would be required. The technology
now exists that provides savings in energy as high as 70–90%, and scenarios using state-of-the-
art technologies and approaches show that energy savings of the order of some 46% by 2050 are
possible; what is more important is that this can be done without major sacrifices to the quality of
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life of those residing in them [51]. In Latin America, particularly, the decarbonization of industry
is also an important priority and is possible through efforts for greater efficiency and a greater
use of renewable energy [57].
4. The implementation challenges: governance and institutions, climate
finance and investments, and knowledge gaps
Given the complexity, magnitude and the scale of the climate change threat, and the importance of
addressing the climate and development linkages, more integrated action and cooperation across
sectors and geographies for more effective policy-making is essential. The following sections give
a brief survey of some of the challenges that policy-makers encounter in pursuing these integrated
approaches and cooperation. The number of challenges is large and varied. They range from
issues of governance and institutions; to the lack of finance and the way in which climate finance
becomes available; to the lack of technologies and know-how that are often not available at the
right time and the right place; and lastly, to the lack of scientific data and information in certain
areas, including knowledge on the linkages and interactions between climate and development
and interlinkages between and among SDGs, as alluded to and briefly reviewed in the climate
and development linkages section above.
(a) Governance
Good and effective governance and strong institutional arrangements are key to the success
of the Paris Agreement and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The success
and effectiveness of policy-making depend on the capacity of policy-makers to develop and
implement programmes of action to address climate change and development in an integrated,
coordinated and comprehensive manner and across sectors, geographies and constituencies. This
applies to climate policy-making in general and to action in most sectors. The energy sector is one
good illustration. Energy systems today are relying more and more on distributed generation
systems. In these systems, a broad range of technologies and fuels, originating from various
sectors, geographies and constituencies, interact to provide energy services. To increase efficiency
and cost optimality, an overall energy systems perspective and integration are required [58].
Climate and development policy formulation in cities, where concerted action is so essential for
the success of the Paris Agreement, is another good illustration of the governance challenges.
Here the constraints of many cities are related to the multi-level governance which forces local
policy-makers to depend on decision-makers at higher political levels and other actors [59–
62]. Governance with devolution at the sub-national level, with policy-makers able to formulate
policy and a regulatory framework, and who have control of the finances that would allow them
to identify, formulate and implement projects across sectors, would seem essential [47,63]. Many
cities unfortunately lack the political authority, the expertise, the finances and the institutional
capacity to identify the best opportunities for low-carbon options and consequently for climate-
related and development policies [64,65]. In all these cases, policy dialogue and interaction across
various sectors, geographies and constituencies is what is required. But this is the challenge.
In this large, complex and fragmented landscape, understanding the political economy context
of the location, region or country where policies, measures and regulations are to take effect
is essential. Governance and institutions are established for managing with information, data,
objectivity and fairness. But political and economic processes vary, often quite considerably,
from locality to locality. The relationships and incentives are not always transparent or fair.
Learning more about these dynamics is particularly important for climate change policies given
the comprehensive set of factors that are involved, and that touch on so many communities and
vested interests. The bottom line is that technical solutions are not enough. Often, the technical
solution is obvious and straight forward. Implementing it is often a lot more complex. These
factors need to be understood and taken into consideration. Fortunately, there is a growing
body of literature that is providing methodology and guidance for this [66–68]. Can the Paris
 on April 3, 2018http://rsta.royalsocietypublishing.org/Downloaded from 
10
rsta.royalsocietypublishing.org
Phil.Trans.R.Soc.A376:20160444
........................................................
Agreement and the SDGs usher in a new era of institutional reform transformation? And what are
the main features and characteristics of this new model of institutional system required for a major
transformation to succeed? This is an area of research that is badly needed. From a preliminary
survey of the literature, it appears that much literature exists on the general subject of climate
governance and climate finance at the international level. The literature on climate and climate
finance governance at the local level is much less abundant [69,70].
A review of the governance literature points to a fragmented institutional landscape that
makes coordinated action difficult and sometimes even impossible [71–75]. A review of the
literature also shows the various efforts to counteract this fragmentation to enable policy-makers
achieve better climate policy integration and climate ‘mainstreaming’ into development. The
field of climate policy integration (CPI) was born out of this concern and its growing literature
is one that has begun to influence the debate of climate policy both in developed (in the EU
particularly) as well as in developing countries [76–78]. Building on the more established field
of environmental policy integration [79], the field of climate policy integration is defined as the
effort to introduce climate policy objectives into other policy sectors while trying to minimize the
potential contradictions in these policies [77]. In its Fifth Assessment Report, the IPCC reinforces
the need for climate policy integration by calling for a type of development that combines
both adaptation and mitigation as a way to promote the building of resilience [80]. Since this
publication, more literature on climate policy integration has focused on the interactions between
climate change mitigation and adaptation with application to the land use sector [81] and other
policy domains such as forestry, agriculture, climate and energy [82].
(b) Climate finance and investments
As the Fifth Assessment Report of the IPCC points out [64], there is no agreed definition of
climate finance. In Chapter 16 on Cross-cutting Investment and Finance Issues, the IPCC adopted
a broad definition of climate finance to include ‘all financial flows whose expected effect is to
reduce net greenhouse emissions or to enhance resilience to the impacts of climate variability and
the projected climate change.’ This broad definition includes domestic as well as international
private and public funds, expenditure on mitigation and adaptation, and the costs of adaptation
to climate variability and to future climate change. For the purposes here, this broader definition is
the one used as it provides a better context for illustrating the significant increase and proliferation
of funds and sources and the diversity of delivery systems at the national level. Given the
magnitude of the investments needed, and the opportunities that these investments may bring,
it is not surprising to see the growing number of actors, sources, funds, agents, investors,
intermediaries, and channels growing at an impressive rate. While this is partly the result of a
much-welcomed increase in the availability of climate finance, the challenge and the costs at the
country level to manage this proliferation for the benefit of national climate change efforts is
immense.
The Climate Policy Initiative (CPI) is one of the most comprehensive and scrutinized
inventories of climate finance. Its latest report [83] gives an excellent overview of what sources
and financial instruments are driving investments and how much climate finance is flowing
globally. Understanding the how, where and from whom finance is flowing towards climate
action and with what motivation, and how public and private sector sources of finance interact, is
essential for the analysis of climate finance governance at the national and local levels. According
to the most recent CPI report, some 62% of climate finance came from private sources ranging
from households to multi-national corporations and their intermediaries. The total figure for
this category was some US$243 billion, provided mostly by renewable energy investments. The
actors in this category were diverse: some US$92 billion came from private project developers,
the largest group by far; some US$58 billion was from corporate actors; US$43 billion came from
households, a growing category; US$46 billion was provided by commercial financial institutions,
private equity and venture capital; infrastructure funds provided some US$1.7 billion; and US$0.9
billion came from institutional investors.
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Public sources including governments, multi-lateral and bilateral aid agencies and national
DFIs were critically important however in this global picture because of their role in driving the
global climate finance system through their knowledge and capacity-building activities and their
role in reducing costs and risks. Some US$148 billion came from public sources, namely DFIs—
national, bilateral and multi-lateral. Of this category, some US$66 billion came from national
DFIs, the largest supplier of public climate finance at the national level; some US$47 billion came
from multi-lateral DFIs; some US$17 billion from bilateral DFIs; US$15 billion from a variety of
government agencies providing direct public contributions to climate projects; US$2 billion from
climate funds; and US$1 billion from various risk management activities.
Despite their comprehensiveness, these figures do not capture much of the domestic resources
dedicated to climate action, including those for adaptation and resilience (which is more directly
linked to the broader SDG agenda and the climate and development linkage) or for investments
in energy efficiency and other mitigation activities which are quite sizable and important. The
figures provided focus mostly on renewable and clean energy investments with some general
estimates of investments in other areas. It is nevertheless a useful breakdown of how much
climate finance was invested, the orders of magnitude, the multiplicity of actors involved, the
proliferation of funding sources, the instruments used, and the complementary roles of the public
and private sectors. It is a very complex landscape indeed [64,84].
The proliferation of funding sources and the fragmentation of climate finance governance is
one of the emerging issues that is posing serious challenges for policy coherence and effectiveness
[71,72,74]. The current fragmentation and proliferation of climate finance makes it difficult and
often impossible for policy-makers to formulate policies and programmes of action that cut
across sectoral and constituency interests. Consequently, the much-needed joint approaches and
integrated solutions for climate change are not always possible, and what is eventually offered
and/or formulated is less than optimal. Many countries are experimenting with new institutional
mechanisms to cope with the fragmentation and complexity of finance and governance. In the
area of climate finance, for example, some countries are establishing national funding entities and
national climate funds [85]. Others, such as Ethiopia, are among the very few that are addressing
the fragmentation of governance of climate and development by merging these two agendas. Its
Climate Resilient Green Economy (CRGE) vision and strategy adopted in 2011 is based on four
pillars: improving agricultural practices while reducing emissions; building and regenerating
forests with a focus on improving ecosystems services and carbon stock; increasing the share
of renewable energy in final energy use; and introducing new technologies in transport, industry
and building for better energy efficiency. The strategy promotes an economic development that
pursues a low-emissions path while building resilience to adapt to climate change [86,87]. The
government instruments for economic and social development, the Growth and Transformation
Plans (GTP) I and II, aim for a high growth level but with climate neutral investments and
policies [88]. In its NDC, Ethiopia reinforces its commitment by making extremely ambitious
commitments to curb its GHG emissions by 64% from the business-as-usual scenario in 2030,
focusing on a few sectors such as energy, buildings, water, agriculture, forestry and transport [89].
5. Conclusion
The extraordinary global achievements of the SDGs and the Paris Agreement provide the best
opportunity yet for strengthening the linkages between climate and development. The evidence
is quite clear. It is difficult if not impossible to reach the ambitious targets of the Paris Agreement
without attending to the development implications. And it would be difficult if not impossible
to reach the SDG goals and targets with worsening impacts of climate change. New approaches
and methodologies are making the task of assessing these linkages more accessible. This includes
the work on a new family of scenarios that tries to bring together analysis of biophysical as well
as economic and social changes and incorporates qualitative analysis. The methodology being
developed for assessing the linkages between and among SDGs will also make it possible for
policy-makers to determine which policies are more suitable to their conditions.
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The commitment of countries through their NDCs to act is a good first step but not nearly
enough. These will need to be ramped up in terms of ambition based on the periodic assessment
and review. The scientific evidence is quite clear as to the scale and magnitude of the action that
needs to be taken and the small window of opportunity. One approach and an important step
is to focus on those areas with a big impact and pay back in terms of emissions reductions.
Some of these were shown here, for example the big projected growth in investments in urban
infrastructure. Using the opportunity of the immense urban infrastructure projected for the next
couple of decades, particularly in Africa and Asia, to ‘do it right’ from the start with low-carbon
technologies would be one important way to make a major impact in decarbonization.
And, finally, issues of governance, institutions and fragmented finance will continue to pose
major challenges for policy- and decision-makers. The hope is that the new demands brought
about by bigger threats if action is not taken to address climate change and development
effectively will force a new era of institution building and governance reform, as the Rio
Conference did in the 1990s. In this respect, the emerging literature and debate on climate policy
integration is encouraging.
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Glossary
Climate finance: The AR5 of the IPCC WG III report adopts a broad definition of climate
change that includes all financial flows whose expected effect is to reduce
net GHG emissions or to enhance resilience to the impacts of climate
variability and the projected climate change
Carbon footprint: The amount of GHG emissions produced to support human activities,
either directly or indirectly
Carbon lock-in: The term refers to the pattern of carbon-intensive technologies to persist
over time due to economic, technical and institutional factors, creating
obstacles for lower carbon alternatives
Climate policy
Integration:
The field of climate policy integration is defined as the effort to
introduce climate policy objectives into other policy sectors while trying
to minimize the potential contradictions in these policies
Decarbonization: Reducing the carbon intensity. For example, the decarbonization of
the power sector means reducing the emissions per unit of electricity
generated
Low carbon urban
Infrastructure:
Infrastructure that is specifically designed to use significantly reduced
amounts of energy and that emits either zero close to zero GHG emissions
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Nationally
determined
contributions
(NDCs):
According to Article 4, paragraph 2, of the Paris Agreement [2], each Party
is asked to prepare, communicate and maintain successive NDCs that it
intends to achieve. Parties are also asked to pursue domestic mitigation
measures, with the aim of achieving the objectives of such contributions.
There will be a global stocktake every 5 years to assess progress with the
first one to take place in 2018
Paris Agreement: The Paris Agreement entered into force on 4 November 2016. For the
first time, and building on the UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change, the agreement brings all the countries of the world together to
combat climate change. The hope is that all nations will join without
exception
Political economy: The analysis of political economy tries to understand the drivers of
political behaviour which may include vested interests, power, incentives,
informal social, political and cultural norms as well as values and ideas
and the influence that this has on the formulation of policies
Sustainable
development
goals (SDGs):
Also known as the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the
SDGs were globally endorsed in 2015 and are composed of 17 broad
development goals and 169 targets to be achieved by 2030
Urban form: This refers to the shape, size, density and configuration of built-up areas
and transportation networks in a city
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